An informative nuanced piece about a civilization country few of us "outsiders" understand.
You accurately point out that, even with diplomats serving in Tehran, it was easy to misjudge what was going on. Complicated countries going through complex political transitions are by definition difficult to follow and understand. Diplomats can easily be in touch with the wrong people and gain a skewed, inaccurate appreciation of the situation. Typically that means out of touch, ossified, urban elites whose hold on power is slipping and who, in response, are desperately seeking the helping hand of foreign innocents abroad, including guileless American diplomats. (In the few frothy political situations I faced--nothing major--I followed a paradoxical axiom: seek contact with those who don't want to be in touch us, and try to remain at some remove from those who actively sought us out--easier said than done).
Besides that, official Americans serving overseas can be blinded or constrained by ideology (communism was the main concern in 1953 and 1978), wishful thinking (the Shah had the situation in hand), and/or high level officials in Washington who believe they know better. Carter's National Security Advisor (Z Brzezinski) was in the latter category. His back channel communication with Iran's Ambassador in DC, Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah's former son in law made him the know it all in Washington about Iran. Sadly, like Paul Wolfowitz later seduced by Ahmed Chalabi in the run-up to the Iraq war, Brzenziski was misled by his self-interested insider contact and terribly wrong. That is, he knew the wrong thing.
The current case is far more cynical. We haven't even tried to understand the other side or to pretend to want to know what's going on. The administration is flying proudly, energetically, and willfully blind. Certain distinguished members of the cabinet even seem to believe that the blind fury of violence part of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity suffices in war. Blow shit up and all will be well. As though the critical political aim part of war will come (as the president said) "naturally" and chance plays no role. As you point out, chance plays a huge part in how things unfold. One final point and then I'll stop: If luck favors the prepared mind, what happens to the willfully unprepared? That's my question.
Thanks for this - very interesting. I'll have to check out this book. "All the Shah's Men," specifically about the overthrow of Mossadegh, was an eye-opener for me.
An informative nuanced piece about a civilization country few of us "outsiders" understand.
You accurately point out that, even with diplomats serving in Tehran, it was easy to misjudge what was going on. Complicated countries going through complex political transitions are by definition difficult to follow and understand. Diplomats can easily be in touch with the wrong people and gain a skewed, inaccurate appreciation of the situation. Typically that means out of touch, ossified, urban elites whose hold on power is slipping and who, in response, are desperately seeking the helping hand of foreign innocents abroad, including guileless American diplomats. (In the few frothy political situations I faced--nothing major--I followed a paradoxical axiom: seek contact with those who don't want to be in touch us, and try to remain at some remove from those who actively sought us out--easier said than done).
Besides that, official Americans serving overseas can be blinded or constrained by ideology (communism was the main concern in 1953 and 1978), wishful thinking (the Shah had the situation in hand), and/or high level officials in Washington who believe they know better. Carter's National Security Advisor (Z Brzezinski) was in the latter category. His back channel communication with Iran's Ambassador in DC, Ardeshir Zahedi, the Shah's former son in law made him the know it all in Washington about Iran. Sadly, like Paul Wolfowitz later seduced by Ahmed Chalabi in the run-up to the Iraq war, Brzenziski was misled by his self-interested insider contact and terribly wrong. That is, he knew the wrong thing.
The current case is far more cynical. We haven't even tried to understand the other side or to pretend to want to know what's going on. The administration is flying proudly, energetically, and willfully blind. Certain distinguished members of the cabinet even seem to believe that the blind fury of violence part of Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity suffices in war. Blow shit up and all will be well. As though the critical political aim part of war will come (as the president said) "naturally" and chance plays no role. As you point out, chance plays a huge part in how things unfold. One final point and then I'll stop: If luck favors the prepared mind, what happens to the willfully unprepared? That's my question.
Fascinating, timely essay.
Alexis, Thanks for that invaluable insider perspective on the challenges facing diplomats.
good piece.
Thanks for this - very interesting. I'll have to check out this book. "All the Shah's Men," specifically about the overthrow of Mossadegh, was an eye-opener for me.
Hi Spencer, Thanks for the book suggestion, sounds very interesting.